The Palestinian Authority’s Pay-to-Slay Dilemma

Despite claims to the contrary, the PA did not really halt its pay-to-slay program. They merely tried to disguise it. 

By Rachel Avraham

For more than two decades, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has run a system of financial allowances for Palestinians imprisoned in Israel, as well as for the families of those killed or injured while attacking Israelis. This program, often referred to as “pay-to-slay,” has long been one of the most contentious issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Israel has long argued that the stipends reward violence and incentivize terrorism. International donors, particularly the United States and the European Union, have repeatedly pressured the PA to dismantle or reform the program.

In early 2025, PA President Mahmoud Abbas announced a dramatic decree to end the direct prisoner and martyr payment system and replace it with a needs-based welfare model. Yet reports from NGOs, journalists, and foreign governments suggest that the practice has not truly ended — it has merely been rebranded or moved to new channels.

This is how the system works: 

  1. The Prisoners’ Fund – Provides salaries to Palestinians serving time in Israeli prisons for security-related offenses.
  2. The Martyrs’ Families Fund – Grants monthly stipends to families of those killed or seriously wounded in attacks.

Both funds are enshrined in PA or PLO legislation, meaning they are not informal aid but official policy.

  In 2016, official PA records showed over 1.1 billion shekels (approx. $300 million) spent on these programs — nearly 7% of the PA’s annual budget.  Payments are graded by severity of offense or length of sentence: the longer the prison term, the higher the monthly salary. Released prisoners often receive lump-sum back pay, sometimes equating to hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Israeli officials argue that this structure creates a financial incentive to commit violence. Families of terrorists are guaranteed stable income, often higher than average Palestinian wages. 

On February 10, 2025, Mahmoud Abbas signed a decree claiming to replace the system with a universal welfare program based on need rather than “martyrdom” or length of prison sentence.

  Abbas declared that the new program would “treat all Palestinians equally according to justice and social needs.”

  PA officials said the reform could impact 35,000 to 40,000 families. The move was largely viewed as an attempt to reduce international pressure and restore donor funding, especially from the U.S.

However, immediate backlash followed:

  Hamas accused Abbas of betraying prisoners and martyrs.

  PA detainee affairs head Qadura Fares was dismissed after criticizing the change.

  Analysts quickly noted that many payments continued, just through different bureaucratic routes.

Despite the decree, watchdog groups and policy institutes argue that the practice is alive and well:

  1. Partial, Not Total Halt – Payments to roughly 1,600 prisoners were suspended, but the majority of stipends remain in place.
  2. Budgetary Obfuscation – Funds are reportedly shifted through the PLO or NGOs, making them less visible in official PA budgets.
  3. Ongoing Allocations – Analysts estimate that hundreds of millions of shekels remain earmarked for prisoner and martyr allowances in 2025.
  4. Political Resistance – Many Palestinian officials continue to defend the payments, framing them as part of the national struggle.

In other words, the “end” of pay-to-slay may be more of a cosmetic reform than a genuine termination.  The Taylor Force Act (2018) bars U.S. aid to the PA as long as the payments continue. In 2025, Congress advanced new legislation to sanction individuals and entities that help facilitate the payments. The EU faces criticism for not doing enough to ensure its contributions are not diverted to these funds.

The Palestinian Authority’s decree in 2025 was meant to close the chapter on pay-to-slay. But evidence suggests the chapter remains open, only rewritten with new words. For Israelis and much of the international community, the payments remain a dangerous incentive that fuels violence.

What is needed:

  1. Transparent auditing of PA and PLO financial flows.
  2. Strict donor conditionality to ensure aid is not misused.
  3. A genuine social welfare program that supports families in need without rewarding acts of violence.
  4. Honest public debate within Palestinian society about whether these payments advance or undermine their national aspirations.

Until such steps are taken, the pay-to-slay dilemma will continue to haunt not only Palestinian politics but also the broader prospects for peace.